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Abstract
We examine how child-allowance policies with pay-as-you-go sys-
tems affect fertility and growth rates. A current method to subsidize
child-rearing households, which determines benefits according to fam-
ily’s number of children, increases the fertility rate but decreases the
growth rate. This study also demonstrates that when a government
initiates a child-allowance policy using some part of the pension bud-
get, the fertility rate declines in aging economies.
Keywords: Fertility, Social security, Uncertain lifetime.
JEL: D91, H55, J13.
∗I would like to thank Koichi Futagami, Ryo Horii, Kazuo Mino, Takashi Oshio, Akira
Yakita, and seminar participants at Osaka University for their helpful comments. All
remaining errors are, of course, my own.
†Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Os-
aka 560-0043, Japan. E-mail address cg088mm@srv.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp (M. Mochida).
1
1 Introduction
Declining fertility rates threaten the feasibility of current social security sys-
tems, thereby posing a serious problem to many advanced countries. On
the other hand, as the active life after retirement becomes longer through a
higher life-expectancy, the importance of public pensions which stabilize a
retired lifestyle is increasing. Pay-as-you-go financed (PAYG-) public pen-
sions, which are the dominant scheme in countries with aging populations,
are supported by working-age people. For that reason, reproduction of the
immediately subsequent generation poses a social problem as long as people
anticipate receiving PAYG-pension benefits after their own retirement. How-
ever, for raising children, who will be contributors to future PAYG-pension
systems, people virtually depend on the expenses of individuals with their
own children.1
This paper describes how child-allowance policies with PAYG systems
affect fertility and growth rates by incorporating an uncertain lifetime. This
model has an endogenous growth mechanism where the engine of growth is
human capital accumulation by parental-teaching education. Children are
treated as consumer durables, as in Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and
Becker (1989).2 Children’s human capital is also assumed to be a source
1Folbre (1994) describes this as Individuals who devote relatively little time or energy
to child-rearing are free-riding on parental labor”.
2When we consider motives for having children, we abstract from the old-age security
hypothesis, because most low-fertility countries have already constructed social security
systems and the degree of such motives in developed countries is much lower relative to
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of utility to the parent, as in Eckstein and Zilcha (1994). Groezen et al.
(2003) show that a child-support policy stimulates fertility rates in a small
open economy but disregard human capital accumulation. We show that a
child-allowance policy increases the fertility rate, but decreases the growth
rate by retarding human capital accumulation.3
In addition, the social security budget for elderly people is commonly
much larger than that for young families with children in low-fertility coun-
tries, such as Japan, Italy, and Spain.4 Therefore, we also analyze an effect
when the government initiates a child-allowance policy by employing some
portion of revenue which has been used for pensions. That is, the govern-
ment diminishes the size of pension systems and redistributes it among the
working generation, who are rearing future contributors. This policy change
leads to a lower fertility rate in high life-expectancy economies with a larger
opportunity cost of having children. This is true because a smaller pension
size in aging economies compels individuals to increase the labor supply to
provide for their post-retirement consumption. Therefore, even if individuals
receive child allowances, they decrease the number of children they choose to
have.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
that in developing economies.
3Zhang (1997) examines how a child-allowance policy affects fertility and growth rates
in a simple model without savings, pensions, and an uncertain lifetime.
4The Japanese social security budget in 2001 for children and families” is 3.7% in
contrast to 68.7% for old-age people”.
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the model. Section 3 explains effects of a child-allowance policy with PAYG-
systems. Section 4 shows effects of the child-allowance policy by diminishing
the size of pension systems. Concluding remarks appear in Section 5.
2 The economy
We use an overlapping-generations model of endogenous growth, incorporat-
ing an uncertain lifetime. The life of a representative individual is divided
into three periods: a childhood and a young-working period, both with fixed
durations, and a retirement period of uncertain length. For simplicity, we
assume that the individual is either alive or dead at the beginning of the
third period. The probability that the individual is alive at the beginning of
the retirement period is denoted as p∈(0, 1], which is known and common to
individuals in the same generation.
Assuming that insurance companies are risk-neutral and that private an-
nuities markets are competitive, the insurance companies promise individuals
a payment of (1+rt+1)
p
at in exchange for having an estate at accruing to the
companies. In the absence of bequest motives, individuals are willing to
invest their assets in such insurance.5
The government levies a tax τ ∈ [0, 1) on wages of young individuals and
redistributes µ part of the revenue to those young child-rearing individuals as
5This is a simplified version of Blanchard’s (1985) model.
4
child allowances, and (1−µ) part of it to retired individuals as PAYG-public
pensions. The value of the allowance per child at time t is described as Qt
and the payment per retired person at time t is described as At.
2.1 Households
In childhood, individuals only accumulate human capital by receiving parental-
teaching. Individuals are endowed with one divisible unit of time in their
young periods, reproduce asexually, and allocate their time toward labor
and raising children. To raise a child, they are compelled to spend their time
in child-rearing and parental-teaching, which helps their children to accumu-
late human capital.6 They receive wage income, which is taxed away, and
allowances according to the number of children in the end of their young
periods. They consume part of their income and invest the rest of their in-
come in annuities. Subsequently, living individuals obtain the principal and
interest from their annuities and consume them with their pension benefits
after retirement.
Each individual who is born at time t, and called generation t+1, accumu-
lates human capital through education by parents at time t. Given parents’
human capital, ht, when a parent allocates time et toward parental-teaching
6In this model, as in Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), the decision of education time is based
on parental altruism. Chamley (1993) and Go¨cke (2004), among others, present a model
in which adult agents divide their own time between schooling and working.
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for one child, the child accumulates human capital ht+1 according to
ht+1 = θe
γ
t ht,
where θ ≥ 1 and γ ∈ (0, 1).7
The endowment time in the young period is normalized to unity. The
time constraint of generation t is then given by
1 = lt + nt+1(q + et),
where lt, nt+1, and q respectively denote the labor time, the number of chil-
dren, and the rearing time per child.8
The budget constraints of a member of generation t when young and
retired are given, respectively, by (1 − τ)wthtlt + Qtnt+1 = cyt + at and
(1+rt+1)
p
at + At+1 = c
o
t+1, where c
y
t is the consumption when young, at is
the annuity, At+1 is the pension benefit, and c
o
t+1 represents post-retirement
consumption.
All individuals have identical preferences. The utility function of genera-
7Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) employ a similar structure.
8Another type of endogenous labor-supply model where agents choose their labor length
considering social security benefits is analyzed in Hu (1979), Momota (2003), and Cremer
et al. (2004).
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tion t(≥ 0) is represented by9
ut = (1− σ)ϕlncyt + p(1− σ)(1− ϕ)lncot+1 + σlnnt+1ht+1. (1)
The parameter σ ∈ (0, 1) can be interpreted as the degree of preference
over total human capital” of their children. The parameter ϕ ∈ (0, 1)
describes the degree of time preference for consumption while young. By
solving individuals’ optimization problems, the optimal values are given by:
nt+1 =
κσ(1− γ)
{q(1− τ)wtht −Qt}It,
lt = 1− κσ{q(1− τ)wtht − γQt}{q(1− τ)wtht −Qt}
1
(1− τ)wtht It,
et =
γ q
1− γ −
γQt
(1− γ)(1− τ)wtht ,
cyt = κ(1− σ)ϕIt,
cot+1 = κp(1− σ)(1− ϕ)
(1 + rt+1)
p
It,
at = κp(1− σ)(1− ϕ)It − pAt+1
(1 + rt+1)
,
where κ≡ 1{1−(1−p)(1−σ)(1−ϕ)} and It≡ (1− τ)wtht + pAt+1(1+rt+1) .
9With an uncertain lifetime, p∈(0, 1], this utility form is employed by Pecchenino and
Pollard (1997), Pecchenino and Utendorf (1999), and Yakita (2001), among others.
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2.2 Production
Competitive firms produce a single final good by employing both physical
capital and effective labor input. The aggregate production function at time
t is given by Yt = F (Kt, htltNt) = K
α
t (htltNt)
1−α, where Yt, Kt, Nt, and
α∈(0, 1) respectively denote the aggregate output, the physical capital which
fully depreciates in the production process, the working-age population, and
the share of physical capital. The production function, in intensive form, can
be expressed as
y˜t = k˜αt ,
where y˜t =
Yt
htltNt
is the output per effective-labor and k˜t =
Kt
htltNt
is the phys-
ical capital per effective-labor.
The factor markets are presumed to be perfectly competitive. Therefore,
the firms take factor prices as given. Firms hire labor inputs and physical
capital up to the point where their marginal products equal their factor
prices:
wt = (1− α)k˜tα,
(1 + rt) = αk˜t
α−1
.
2.3 Equilibrium
The government faces the budget constraints of the policies:
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child allowances; µτwthtltNt = Qtnt+1Nt,
public pensions; (1− µ)τwthtltNt = AtpNt−1.
Using capital market-clearing conditions, Kt+1 = atNt, we can get the values
at equilibrium as follows.10
nt+1 =
[µτΨ+ κσ{1 + (1− µ)τ (1−α)
α
}{(1− γ)(1− τ)− µγτ}]
q{1− (1− µ)τ}Ψ ≡ng,
lt =
(1− τ)
{1− (1− µ)τ} [1−
κσ{1 + (1− µ)τ (1−α)
α
}
Ψ
]≡lg,
et =
γqκσ{1− (1− µ)τ}{1 + (1− µ)τ (1−α)
α
}
[µτΨ+ κσ{1 + (1− µ)τ (1−α)
α
}{(1− γ)(1− τ)− µγτ}]≡eg,
where Ψ≡ [1 + κ{1− (1− σ)(1− ϕ)}(1− µ)τ (1−α)
α
].
The growth rate of per-capita output at time t is
(1 + gt) ≡
Yt+1
Nt+1
Yt
Nt
= (
k˜t+1
k˜t
)α
ht+1
ht
.
The capital per effective labor becomes ˜kt+1 = k˜t = k˜∗ in the steady state.11
10Note that an increase in life expectancy lowers the fertility rate.
11The equilibrium sequence of capital per effective labor is
k˜t+1 =
κp(1− σ)(1− ϕ)(1− α)
Eglgng
k˜αt ,
where Eg≡θeγg . This dynamics is always stable due to assumption of α ∈ (0, 1). In the
steady state, the physical capital per effective labor becomes
k˜∗ = (
κp(1− σ)(1− ϕ)(1− α)
Eglgng
)
1
1−α .
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Consequently, the per-capita growth rate in the balanced-growth path de-
pends only on the parental-teaching time. It is given by
(1 + g∗) = θeγg .
3 Policy effects
The following proposition summarizes effects of an introduction of the child-
allowance policy and the PAYG-pension system.
Proposition 1. Introduction of a child-allowance policy and a PAYG-
pension system increases the number of children and decreases the labor time.
When the government introduces the child-allowance policy, the education
time per child and the per-capita growth rate decrease. When the government
introduces the PAYG-pension system only, the introduction has no effects on
the education time per child and the per-capita growth rate.
Proof. Initially, the effect on the number of children is positive, as
∂ng
∂τ
|τ=0 = 1
q
[µ(1− κσ) + (1− µ)κ2pσ(1− σ)(1− ϕ)(1− γ)(1− α)
α
] > 0.
This sign is satisfied with any µ∈[0, 1]. Consequently, this form of govern-
mental intervention always increases the fertility rate.
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Secondly, the effect on the labor time is negative, as
∂lg
∂τ
|τ=0 = −[µ(1− κσ) + (1− µ)κ2pσ(1− σ)(1− ϕ)(1− α)
α
] < 0.
This sign is also satisfied with any µ∈[0, 1].
Lastly, the effect on the education time per child is given by
∂eg
∂τ
|τ=0 = −µ(1− κσ)γq
κσ(1− γ)2 ≤ 0.
This sign is negative when µ∈(0, 1], and zero when µ = 0. That is, the
intervention with child allowances (µ > 0) decreases the education time per
child. However, the introduction of a public pension without child allowances
(µ = 0) has no effects on the education time per child.
Therefore, the effect on the per-capita growth rate in the balanced-growth
path depends on the per-child education time; it is given by
∂(1 + g∗g)
∂τ
|τ=0 =
∂θeγg
∂τ
|τ=0 ≤ 0.
These results are explained as follows. The prices, in labor terms, of
raising and educating a child are, respectively, q − Qt
(1−τ)wtht and nt+1. The
number of children increases because of income effects and price effects by
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the intervention. The per-child education time decreases because negative
price effects dominate positive income effects. When only the pension system
exists, the negative price effects are proportional to positive income effects.
Therefore, there is no change in education time.
4 Fertility and life expectancy
This section presents analysis of fertility effects when the government intro-
duces a child-allowance policy using µ part of the revenue which has been
spent on the PAYG-pension systems.12 That is, the government partly di-
minishes the transfer from young to old and redistributes resources among
young individuals to increase contributors in the future.13
The effect of such a policy change on the fertility rate can be recognized
by the sign of the following formula.
∂ng
∂µ
|µ=0 = s2p2 − [σ(1− γ)(1− τ)(1− α)
α
− {σ + 2(1− σ)ϕ}{1 + τ (1− α)
α
}]sp
+(1− σ)ϕ(1− s){1 + τ (1− α)
α
}2 ≡ f(p ; τ),
where s ≡ (1− σ)(1− ϕ) > 0.
This is a quadratic function of life expectancy, p. Herein, we shall see a
12We can easily see that the per-child education time always decreases, as in section 3.
When the government introduces the child-allowance policy by levying a new labor tax
for the sole purpose of supporting the policy, the fertility rate always increases.
13Because individuals in each generation are assumed to be homogenous, this policy
change exactly eases the tax burden of the young generation.
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case in which the policy change engenders a lower fertility rate.14 The sign
of f(p ; τ) is either positive or negative depending on p, if both the labor-
capital distribution ratio and the labor-tax rate are
(1− α)
α
> α1 and 0 < τ < τ1,
where α1≡ 1σ(1−ϕ)(1−γ) and τ1≡−[σ(1−γ)s+(1−σ){σ(1−ϕ)+2ϕ}]+
√
Υ
2(1−σ)ϕ(1−s) (1−α)
α
.15 The critical
value of the old-age degree in the economy, p1, which is an intersection of
graph f(p ; τ) with the x-axis, is the smaller solution of f(p ; τ) = 0:16
p1≡ [σ(1− γ)(1− τ)
(1−α)
α
− {σ + 2(1− σ)ϕ}{1 + τ (1−α)
α
}]−√Φ
2s
.
Therefore, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.
When the labor-capital distribution ratio is (1−α)
α
> α1 and the labor-tax rate
is 0 < τ < τ1, an introduction of the child-allowance policy using some part
of pension revenue
(3a) increases the fertility rate if p∈(0, p1),
(3b) decreases the fertility rate if p∈(p1, 1],
14See Appendix for another case.
15Υ≡σ2(1− ϕ)2 + 4σ(1− γ)ϕ(1− ϕ)(1− s) (1−α)α
+2(1− σ)σ(1− γ)s{σ(1− ϕ) + 2ϕ}+ σ2(1− γ)2s2 > 0
16Φ≡{σ2 + 4(1− σ)ϕ(1− s)2(1 + s)}{1 + τ (1−α)α }2 + σ2(1− γ)2(1− τ)2( 1−αα )2
−2σ{σ + 2(1− σ)ϕ}(1− γ)(1− τ){1 + τ (1− α)
α
} (1− α)
α
> 0
13
(3c) has no effects on the fertility rate if p = p1.
In the event of a larger labor share, which implies higher labor income,
or a lower labor-tax rate, the opportunity cost of having children becomes
large. In aging economies, where working-age individuals face a high proba-
bility that they will be alive in their retirement periods, pension and annuity
amount per capita is relatively small by the larger old-population. Therefore,
if the pension benefit is decreased by the policy change, individuals have an
incentive to increase the labor supply for their retired-age consumption. For
that reason, even if individuals receive child allowances for having children,
they decrease the number of children those they have.
5 Concluding remarks
We have presented the effects of child-allowance policies. When child al-
lowances are given to parents depending on the number of children, parents
have an incentive to increase the quantity” of children without maintain-
ing the quality” of each child. Some empirical studies discuss whether
child-allowance policies actually increase the fertility rate or not. It might
be important that individuals are guaranteed sufficient pension benefits to
stimulate the fertility rate in aging economies.
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Appendix.
The following proposition summarizes positive effects of an introduction of
the child-allowance policy on the fertility rate.
Proposition.
An introduction of the child-allowance policy using some portion of pension
revenue increases the fertility rate, when
(2a) the labor-capital distribution ratio is (1−α)
α
≤α1,
(2b) the labor-capital distribution ratio is (1−α)
α
> α1 and the labor-tax rate
is τ1 < τ < 1.
The introduction has no effects on the fertility rate when the labor-capital
distribution ratio is (1−α)
α
> α1 and the labor-tax rate is τ = τ1.
Proof. The following f(p ; τ), which is a quadratic function of p, expresses
the effect on the fertility rate.17
f(p ; τ) =
∂nt+1
∂µ
|µ=0 = s2[p− Γ]2 + Λ.
The graph of f(p ; τ) is convex downward and the value of f(0 ; τ) is posi-
tive.18 The condition by which the value of f(1 ; τ) is negative” allows the
17 Γ≡ [σ(1−γ)(1−τ)
(1−α)
α −{σ+2(1−σ)ϕ}{1+τ (1−α)α }]
2s ,
Λ≡− [σ(1−γ)(1−τ)
(1−α)
α −{σ+2(1−σ)ϕ}{1+τ (1−α)α }]2
4 + (1− σ)ϕ(1− s){1 + τ (1−α)α }2.
18f(0 ; τ) = (1− σ)ϕ(1− s){1 + τ (1−α)α }
2
> 0.
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graph of f(p ; τ) to intersect the x-axis once in p∈(0, 1].19 .
The value of f(1 ; τ) is expressed by a function of τ :
f(1 , τ) = (1− s)(1− σ)ϕ{(1− α)
α
}2τ 2
+[(1− σ){σ(1− ϕ) + 2ϕ}+ sσ(1− γ)](1− α)
α
τ
+[(1− σ)− sσ(1− γ)(1− α)
α
].
The sign of f(1 , 1) is positive.20 Because the first and second terms of
f(1 , τ) are positive, the sign of this function depends on the third term.
When the labor-capital distribution ratio is
(1− α)
α
≤ 1
σ(1− ϕ)(1− γ)≡α1,
the third term is non-negative. Therefore, the sign of f(1 , 0) is positive;
thereby, that of f(1 ; τ) is positive for any τ(> 0). Consequently, the value
of f(p ; τ) is always positive in p∈(0, 1].
When the third term is negative, as (1−α)
α
> α1, the graph of f(1 , τ) has
an intercept in τ∈(0, 1). The intersection is a larger solution of f(1 , τ) = 0:21
τ1≡−[σ(1− γ)s+ (1− σ){σ(1− ϕ) + 2ϕ}] +
√
Υ
2(1− σ)ϕ(1− s) (1−α)
α
.
19To evade intricacy, we eliminate the case in which the graph intersects the x-axis twice.
20f(1 , 1) = (1− σ)[1 + {σ(1− ϕ) + 2ϕ} (1−α)α + (1− s)ϕ( 1−αα )2] > 0.
21Υ≡σ2(1− ϕ)2 + 4σ(1− γ)ϕ(1− ϕ)(1− s) (1−α)α
+2(1− σ)σ(1− γ)s{σ(1− ϕ) + 2ϕ}+ σ2(1− γ)2s2 > 0
16
The value of f(1 ; τ) is negative when τ∈(0, τ1) and positive when τ∈(τ1, 1).
Therefore, when (1−α)
α
> α1 and τ1 < τ < 1, the value of f(p ; τ) is always
positive in p∈(0, 1]. When (1−α)
α
> α1 and 0 < τ < τ1, the value of f(p ; τ) is
positive or negative depending on p.
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